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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE
QUASI-INVISIBLE HAND*
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG
University of California, Davis

T

HrE fundamental principle of economics is that people will pursue their
own self-interest within a given institutional framework. The economist's
basic policy premise is that (so long as certain "market failures" do not arise)
this self-interest will, like an Invisible Hand, guide resources to their proper
usage; when market failures arise the usual policy prescription is to amend
the rules (for example, by breaking up monopolies, placing an "optimal" tax
on pollution, or redefining property rights) to make the marginal private costs
and benefits equal to the marginal social costs and benefits so that the free
play on self-interest will again achieve desirable results.' But this picture imposes an arbitrary demarcation on the boundaries of self-interest: not only
will people pursue their self-interest within the rules; they will also allocate
resources toward changing the rules to their own benefit. When the full implications of this seemingly modest extension are understood, normative economics enters an Alice-in-Wonderland world in which policies that are
desirable in the truncated model lose much of their appeal.
To be sure, economists have not totally ignored the role of self-interest in
determining the institutional structure. Stigler, for example, states: "Any
portion of the society which can secure control of the state's machinery will
employ the machinery to improve its own position."12 Consequently, Stigler
* I would like to thank the following people for their constructive criticisms of
earlier drafts: Jack Ayer, Robert Boyd, Brian Burwell, Richard Cornwall, John Cupps,
Race Davies, Bruce Glassburner, Robert Goldfarb, Kenneth Goldin, Rodolfo Gonzalez,
Eric Gustafson, Thomas Lenard, Frank Levy, Blair Lord, Thomas Mayer, William Moss,
Lloyd Musolf, Richard Nelson, Alan Olmstead, Jim Roumasset, Werner Schink, David
Tacy, Elias Tuma, Kenneth Watt, Aaron Wildavsky, and the participants in the Industrial Organization Workshop at the University of Chicago. Part of my research was
financed by a grant from the National Science Foundation (G.I.-27).
1This simple approach has been considerably complicated in recent years by the
economist's belated discovery of transactions costs and uncertainty.
2 George J. Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J. Law &
Econ. 1 (1970). See also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell
J. Econ. & Man. Sci. 3 (1971). Lance Davis & Douglass North, Institutional Change and
American Economic Growth 10 (1971), make self-interest the prime mover of their
predictive model of institutional change. "[Elconomic institutions are innovated or prop-
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and others (for example, Coase 3 and Buchanan 4) argue that this is one more
point in favor of using the market and against governmental intervention.
Their conclusion, however, does not follow from the proposition. The argument cuts both ways; in some instances, we shall argue, Stigler's proposition
should enhance the desirability of government action.
As an example of the influence of self-interest on institutional choice and
the difficulties it creates for policymakers, consider the problem of the "standard form contract." Consumers regularly enter into contracts with the terms
specified by the producer-they are what we might call "contract term takers."
When a customer parks a car in a parking lot he enters into a contract specifying liability for theft or damage and a number of other terms. Bargaining
over the terms of the contract is usually not possible; neither the lot attendant nor the customer would normally be capable of preparing a valid agreement and lawyer's fees would make redrafting out of the question. The lot
owner who will enter into a large number of agreements will find it in his best
interest to have a lawyer "mass produce" a standard contract: this contract
should reflect the owner's interests in the best possible manner. If customers
could band together somehow and spread the costs they might be able to
render the contract terms more favorable to themselves. There are a number
of ways to effect this. One method would be to use lawsuits to obtain a judicial narrowing of the lot owner's discretion in stating contract terms (financing for the suit might come from a single martyr or an automobile association);
another would be to establish legislative restrictions on the terms of the contracts; a third would be to leave adjustment of contract terms to a parking
lot licensing or regulating agency. Lot owners have an incentive to avoid these
solutions, maintain maximum control over contract terms, and make legal
action as expensive as possible for the customer (for example, attain the right
to hold the customer's car until the litigation is settled).
While such a solution might prove ideal for the lot owner, it might prove
to be too expensive, politically, to bring about. The owner will have to decide
erty rights are revised because it appears desirable for individuals or groups to undertake
the costs of such changes; they hope to capture some profit which is unattainable under
the old arrangement." The Davis-North approach is quite different from the one suggested here; for a further discussion of the Davis-North model, see Alan L. Olmstead &
Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth: A Critique of
Davis and North, in 12 Explorations in Entrepreneurial History (forthcoming, Spr. 1975).
A clear linkage of self-interest and institutional choice is made by Samuels; his approach
is similar in spirit to that of the present paper. See Warren J. Samueis, Interrelations
Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J. Law & Econ. 435 (1971); and Welfare
Economics, Power and Property, in Perspectives on Property 61 (Gene L. Wunderlich &
W. L. Gibson, Jr. eds. 1972).
SR. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law & Econ. 29 (1959).
4
James M. Buchanan, The Bases for Collective Action 15-16 (1972).
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at what point stacking the deck in his favor is no longer worth the resources
he must use to do so. (Competition between producers facing "contract term
takers" will also constrain the lot owner's ability to stack the deck. For a
number of reasons developed below in Section VI such competition will be
only partially successful.) By allocating fewer resources he might attain results nearly as good by, for example, supporting a regulatory agency which
would be structured to be sympathetic to the lot owners' position. The customers (or their representatives) will have to make similar allocational decisions. The conscientious policymaker must decide how much the balance
should be tilted in favor of one group; a judge, for example, might have to
determine whether the terms of the contract were to be taken literally or, if
not, how to determine what the contract actually does promise. A legislator
must consider how much statutory determination of the terms is necessary
to give the consumer a "fair" deal and whether the costs in terms of efficiency
of imposing these terms (if indeed there are any costs) are worth these gains. 5
In addition, the policymaker must consider the reactions of the parties to his
attempted intervention. If attempts to restructure the rules against one side
(say, the lot owners) will induce that side to employ resources to prevent
that change, at what point are the gains outweighed by these costs? If the
policymaker forecloses one set of alternatives will the lot owner choose a more
objectionable path instead--one that the lot owner and the customer both find
inferior?
The standard form contract is not an isolated problem despite its nearly
complete absence from the economics literature; Slawson suggests that 99
per cent of the contracts a consumer enters into are standard forms.6 The
problem will be discussed in more detail in Section VI. In the next four
sections a theoretical framework for analyzing institutional change will be
developed. Section II presents the theory under a number of restrictive as5 In recent years there has developed a substantial literature analyzing the implications
of the pursuit of self-interest by government officials-legislators (see Anthony Downs,
An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) and bureaucrats (see William A. Niskanen,
Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971)). By ignoring this subject we do
not mean to imply that no problem exists; we are only assuming that the "degree of
venality" of public officials can be treated as given. It should be noted in passing that
virtually all economic analyses of the incentives of government officials focus on legislators and bureaucrats, ignoring judges. (For exceptions see Gordon Tullock, Public
Decisions as Public Goods, 79 J. Pol. Econ. 913 (1971); and Martin A. Levin, Urban
Politics and Judicial Behavior, 1 J. Leg. Studies 193 (1972).) Yet judges, at least in this
country, are either elected officials or are appointed by elected officials; they are, like
legislators or bureaucrats, human beings with the same types of motivations. Their behavior
is determined in the same manner, in part by their role perceptions and in part by their
own self-interest.
6 W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-making
Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (1971).
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sumptions; in the ensuing sections some of the restrictive assumptions will
be dropped. The primary purpose of the theory is not to develop testable
hypotheses, although with a few extensions it could profitably be used in this
manner; 7 the purpose is avowedly normative-to determine how extending
the domain of self-interest to the determination of the rules themselves
changes the relative desirability of certain institutional arrangements.
It is convenient at this juncture to introduce the notion of a social engineer: an individual who is attempting to manipulate the rules "in the public
interest." The social engineer can be an ivory tower academic or a legislator,
judge, or other policymaker. It is important to note that economists regularly
cast themselves in the role of a social engineer asking: when is regulation or
government action justified; when do markets fail; what is the optimal
level of pollution? In the context of this paper, Milton Friedman is a social
engineer attempting to change the rules (volunteer army, freely fluctuating
exchange rates, free trade, voluntary unions, etc.) to advance the common
weal. We stress this point only because some readers of earlier drafts were
very uneasy about the social engineer and feared that we were advocating
the creation of a new powerful official.
Before proceeding, one final caveat is in order. If the rules were completely
determined by self-interest there would be no room for public policy. The
working assumption of this paper is that there is a substantial amount of
slack in the system which will give the social engineer some room to bend the
rules toward producing desirable outcomes. That is, the extended self-interest
model suggests not an inexorable process, but certain tendencies-tendencies
not revealed by the truncated model. These tendencies, while weak enough
to grant the policymaker some leeway, will be of sufficient strength so that
ignoring them will yield misleading policy guidance.
I
In this section the outlines of a theory of institutional change will be
sketched. It will be convenient to begin with three simplifying assumptions:
(1) individuals either act independently or in monolithic coalitions (like the
firm of neoclassical theory)-to simplify exposition we will hereafter simply
refer to groups, noting that a group may have only one member; (2) groups
have a single resource-financial wealth-to allocate toward influencing institutional choice; and (3) the information available to any group concerning
the effects on it of a given institutional change is both imperfect and taken
as given-manipulation of the information stream is not permitted. (In a
similar manner, tastes concerning outcomes and the legitimacy of certain in7 See Alan L. Olmstead & Victor P. Goldberg, supra note 2.
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stitutions are taken as given and not subject to manipulation.) These assumptions will be relaxed one at a time in the next three sections.
The group faces the usual allocation decision: how should it use the scarce
resources at its disposal to maximize its utility? In the usual model in which
institutional structure is taken as a given, the answer is that the marginal
benefit of the last dollar spent on each good purchased should be equal. This
rule can be extended so that the expected marginal benefit of the last dollar
spent on influencing institutions in any particular subject area will be equal
to that of the last dollar spent on other influence and the last dollar spent on
8
any good: marginal benefit will be equal to marginal cost.
The net benefits of expenditures on influence depend on the expenditures
of opposing groups. If these other groups would be harmed by a certain
change (or they perceive that they will be so) they will allocate resources to
prevent it. The more opposing groups spend to prevent a change (or to direct
change in a different direction), the fewer benefits a group will gain from a
given level of spending. Convincing a legislator, by lobbying activities, bribes,
or whatever, will be more costly if someone else is trying to influence him in
another direction. Thus, A's allocation of its budget toward institutional influence depends on how B, C, and D allocate their resources. And their allocations depend on how A allocates its resources. More precisely, these
allocations will depend on guesses concerning the strategy of the other actors.
Strategic interdependence is clearly an important facet of the problem. Yet
useful insights can be gained by assuming it away. Suppose that: (1) group
A takes the predicted expenses of opposing groups as given and that these
predictions are not too far off the mark; (2) the relation between these expenses and the decline in A's benefits is also specified; (3) the benefits can
all be measured in dollars; 9 and (4) units of influence can be defined. 10
Figure I can be used to illustrate A's choice problem.
8 The terminology--"maximzation" and "the equation of marginal benefit and cost"-should not be taken too seriously. Clearly, ignorance about the benefits of various institutional changes will be pervasive. All we mean to say is that individuals, frequently
acting through groups, will pursue their own interests as best they can given what they
perceive to be the benefits and costs of their actions.
9 The gains sought are often much more complicated than simply "more income." Groups
can try to determine what shall be considered "economic goods," or, more generally, the
groups can attempt to alter the relative prices of goods. For example, suppose that
Smith feels worse off if anyone wears blue shoes; under current rules the "price" to him
of purchasing the "good" that other people not wear blue shoes is prohibitive. Even if
there were a large number of people like Smith who disapproved of blue shoes, these
people would find it virtually impossible to get together and collectively bribe others to
not wear blue shoes. If, however, there existed a commission that approved the types
of clothing that people might wear, Smith and his allies might find it possible to make
their weight felt-the price of satisfying this taste is lower under this new set of rules.
While blue shoes might not be a particularly interesting social problem, the structure

THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

$/Unit
a
C

ob
MB*

Units of Influence
Figure I
MB* represents the marginal benefits to A if there were no opposing
expenditures.11 It is downward sloping since A will attempt to use its influence
first where it yields the greatest payoff. MB* represents the maximum increof the problem is the same as many other more controversial questions. Suppose Smith
disapproved of other people watching low quality television programs, or reading pornography, or living in racially segregated neighborhoods, or building structures along a previously undeveloped coastline. Under one set of rules the price of satisfying any of these
preferences is virtually infinite. Under other sets of rules the price can be substantially
lower; indeed, one rule change is to give Smith the "property right" (or a share of the
collective property right) and require those who want to read pornography, despoil
the coast, or whatever, to pay him.
IDThis is an heroic assumption. The only justifications for it are (1) it facilitates
exposition and (2) economists regularly make such assumptions--for example, in the
standard treatment of public goods the horizontal axis is used to represent such nebulous
concepts as units of "national defense" or "enforcement of the law" (two areas that
most economists are willing to put in the near-pure public good category).
11 We assume for convenience that the curves are continuous.
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mental net benefit that A can achieve for a given increment of influence.
Thus, if $1000 is spent on influence, the best strategy might be the pursuit
of a higher tariff (a). However, further increases in tariffs (b) might yield
smaller rewards than alternative strategies, say, opposing consumer protection
legislation (c).
If other groups are permitted to spend money for opposing group A, then
the benefits to A of each spending strategy -decline (or remain the same)12
The relative decline in benefits for each strategy will depend on the ease of
opposing the change (which depends on the initial rules and the apparent
legitimacy of the change), l8 the financial ability to oppose change, and the
importance of opposing change-whether the opponents stand to lose a lot
by the change; a change making A better off without making anyone else
worse off (that is, a Pareto-optimal change) 14 will presumably engender little
or no opposition, while a purely redistributive one will entail substantial
resistance. So, in Figure II, the value of redistributive strategy a might fall
to c with the opponents spending their optimal amount, while Pareto-optimal
strategy b will not be opposed and will be as valuable as before. In the diagram, the second strategy would now be adopted earlier than the first; the
1

2 If there were other groups benefitting from a given change, there could be an
increase. For Pareto-optimal changes (discussed later in the paragraph) we would expect
no decline in benefits to A and quite likely an increase if others (who also benefit) are
also willing to support the change. It is convenient (but not necessary) to treat other
groups as strictly competing so that the expenditures of others do not increase the
benefits to A.
18 The influence of the initial rules is obvious. For example, if the required electoral
majority is raised from one-half to two-thirds, A would have to spend more to achieve
a given change while B would have to spend less to prevent it.
The cultural milieu in which choice takes place is an important determinant of the
ease with which change takes place. The milieu confers varying degrees of legitimacy on
tactics, rules, and outcomes, making some strategies relatively more desirable than others.
If a large number of people believe that the airwaves belong to the public, then they will
resist changes which remove the airwaves from the public domain. The widely-held belief
that a man should be able to do what he wants with "his property" raises the costs
of establishing an institution that infringes upon these "rights," for example, open housing
or zoning. (And, conversely, it lowers the costs of opposing these changes or of introducing new changes that are compatible with this position.) It might, therefore, be
worthwhile for groups to invest in influencing the cultural milieu; this possibility is
discussed in Section V.
14 Given that the world is characterized by high transactions costs and woefully incomplete information, Pareto-optimality becomes a very ephemeral concept. If individuals
who will be made worse off perceive that they will not be worse off because they are not
capable of evaluating the results, is the change Pareto-optimal? Is a change Paretooptimal if the expected change in utility for all parties is non-negative, or should the
results be judged ex post? In this paper a Pareto-optimal change will be one in which
most parties will not be made worse off, ex post. By concentrating on Pareto-optimal
change we will avoid the difficulties of determining whether a given arrangement is

Pareto-optimal-that is, one from which no further Pareto-optimal changes can be made.
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points b' and c' on MB (which represents the marginal benefits accruing to
A given the optimal level of expenditure by the opposition) illustrate this
new ranking.
A's optimization decision depends on its costs as well. The costs include not
only expenditures on such activities as lobbying for legislation or for favorable

treatment by bureaucrats, but also the expenditure of the group for using the
rules-for example, legal fees for using the courts to enforce a claim under
the rules or to prepare legal contracts that are within the established rules.15
15
The preparation of private contracts can be viewed as a delegation of legislative
authority from the state to the private parties. See John R. Commons, Legal Foundations
of Capitalism (1924); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 Col. L. Rev. 629 (1943); and W. David Slawson, supra note 6.
This view contrasts sharply with that implicit in most economic analysis (and explicit
in some--see James M. Buchanan, supra note 4) that private contract is the norm
and individuals will delegate tasks to a government if private contract proves inappro-
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The group's wealth and ability to borrow limit the amount of influence it
can buy. As funds become more expensive, the cost of further influence rises
(hence the upward slope of the MC curves in Figure III). One reason for
this is that as the size of the loan rises relative to the group's assets, the risk
of non-repayment increases; lenders will require a greater premium for this
risk or will simply refuse to make funds available. 16 A second, more political,
explanation of why some groups might face a rising cost of funds curve is
that lenders will be reluctant to lend funds for institutional influence unless
that influence is in a direction that they (the lenders) prefer. (Tenant unions,
for example, might find funding difficult to come by.) Those trying to influence the rules in a manner generally unfavorable to the financiers 17 will in
some cases find themselves without financial resources or will have to resort
to attaining their financing from secondary (higher priced) sources; their
costs will be higher than groups whose goals are consistent with those of the
financiers-their costs would be MC 3 rather than MC2 in Figure III. This
suggests the existence of a "multiplier effect" for the power of finance capital
in influencing institutional change.18
An exogenous increase in A's wealth would cause the marginal cost curves
to shift outward (MC3 will shift to MC 2 in Figure III). In general, an inpriate. In the discussion of standard form contracts infra (Section VI), we will find the
perspective of Commons, et al., to be very useful.
The costs also would include the costs that accrue to A of changing the rule. For
example, the costs of tariff protection would include A's share of the future costs of
administering the tariff as well as the costs of printing and distributing the legislation.
Such costs will usually be insignificant as they will be spread over a wide constituency;
however, this need not always be the case. The extent to which the costs can be spread
depends on the existing rules, and these rules can therefore become a significant political
background.
16 This is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a problem of "imperfect capital markets."
But this is precisely what we would expect a perfect capital market to do given the
existence of imperfect information; see George J. Stigler, Imperfections in the Capital
Market, 75 J. Pol. Econ. 287 (1967).
17 The financier's screening can have two different types of effects. On the one hand,
a group might have only a few possible strategies that might be obnoxious to the financiers; because of the financiers' opposition these particular strategies would have a lower
ranking relative to alternative strategies than would otherwise be the case. On the other
hand, the group's entire platform might prove offensive to the financiers, thus weakening
its position across the board.
If we drop the simplifying assumption that all benefits can be measured in dollars,
then we would expect that groups that receive benefits that are not easily converted to
dollars (for example, conservationists winning public control over a wilderness area) will
have a higher cost curve since financiers will realize that even if the group wins, the
victory will not enhance the group's ability to repay the loan.
18 This multiplier effect suggests a possible bridge between the "power elite" and the
"pluralist interest group" theories of politics. For a description of these, see The Power
Elite in America (Norman L. Crockett ed. 1970).
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crease in A's wealth will lead to its spending more (or the same amount) on
influence and attaining greater (or equal) benefits. The advantages of wealth
are likely to be even greater if there are economies of scale in influence. If a
minimum threshold expenditure on influence must be made (say, to hire a
full-time lobbyist and staff or to hire lawyers to negotiate a contract) before
any rewards are forthcoming, then poorer groups might find the optimal
expenditure to be zero. Thus, for MB (Figure IV), A receives no benefits
from influence until the threshold level X is reached. If it faced MC1 , the
threshold would make no difference; if, however, it faced MC2 , the threshold
would be beyond the group's borrowing capacity-it would not invest at all.
MB 2 represents a less extreme picture of the economies of scale in influence;
the group would now find some investment worthwhile if it were facing MC 2,
although if it faced MC3 it would still find no investment profitable. In any
event it is clear that the existence of substantial economies of scale in influence will accentuate the advantage of relatively wealthy groups in the insti-
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tutional choice arena. This diagram also illustrates the advantages that might
accrue to one party of strategies that increase the requisite scale necessary
for attaining influence. Some groups, for example, will find it in their interest
to bring some issues into the arena of private contract primarily because
their opponents cannot afford to attain the benefits of scale economies in
legal assistance.
It is useful to summarize the basic implications of the analysis to this point.
There is a kernel of truth in the notion that institutions will adjust to changes
in technology, tastes, or relative prices to yield new, more efficient configurations.19 This is especially true if the gains of the change to some groups are
large and the costs to other groups are negligible or if there are no net losers
at all. The analysis suggests that the gainers will value such changes highly

and will meet little opposition spending which would make the strategy even
19

See, for example, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am.
Econ. Rev. No. 2, at 347 (Papers &Proceedings, May, 1967) ; and Lance Davis & Douglass

North, supra note 2.
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more desirable relative to alternatives. However, it is also dear that these will
not be the only institutional changes that take place. The group's incentives
are not to maximize the size of the pie for society; the incentive instead is to
maximize the rewards to the group. If the group can better its lot by "buying"
tariff protection or government enforcement of entry restrictions, it will not
be concerned with the antisocial effects of such a purchase. In particular,
changes that benefit some groups at the expense of other groups too poor to
oppose the changes effectively will be likely to occur. 20 The relative power of
the respective parties will determine which institutional changes are adopted.
There is no reason, therefore, to treat the institutional outcomes as desirable. The pursuit of self-interest will not yield institutions which will lead to
production of a socially optimal output mix; the exercise of power (that is,
investment in influence) will affect the technical efficiency of production as
well as the distribution of benefits.
To be sure, this result should come as no surprise. Tariffs, subsidies, and
tax exemptions are all expected results of the free play of self-interest in
determining the rules. This is precisely the point that Stigler and others make.
But the crucial point is this: the mechanism applies equally to what we normally call the "free market"-a set of transactions governed by the general
law of contract and enforced by private action through the courts. In many
instances the free market solution (1) will make other groups worse off than
they would be under alternative rules and (2) will not be the most efficient
arrangement (for example, it might not permit the achievement of certain
collective action such as pollution abatement). That is, private contract will
be a preferred strategy for a group for the same reason as any other institutional arrangement-because that group stands to gain by the arrangement.
It is the best one group can do, given the willingness and ability of other
groups to oppose it.
In effect we are saying that the truncated model fails to follow a process
through to equilibrium. This failure can best be seen by analogy. A noneconomist might argue that a policy of rent control will make the poor better
off by keeping down their rent; the economist knows, however, that this is
not the end of the-story and that a likely ending will entail a smaller housing
stock for the poor. But, in the present context, the economist is essentially
guilty of this same sort of reasoning. A policy to "use the market" for a given
20

Lance Davis & Douglass North, supra note 2, at 27 find that their approach works
best in the case in which there are no losers or the losers are too weak to stop the gainers.
The analysis should not be interpreted as suggesting that at any point in time the poor,
unorganized groups will be suffering rule changes that make them worse off. After all,
one cannot get blood from a turnip. Instead we should realize that such groups are
losing in an "opportunity cost" sense-they are unable to "buy" rule changes that would
help them.
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problem will affect the distribution of power. The net gainers can then use
their increased power to further influence the rules. Thus, to put the point as
paradoxically as possible, a non-governmental solution to a problem could,
after adjustment to the new power configuration was completed, entail a net
increase in the level of governmental activity. More generally, a decision will
affect the distribution of power and will therefore influence the distribution
of benefits and the efficiency of production in ways that are not anticipated
by the truncated model.
This analysis puts the recent literature on the politics of regulation in a
new perspective. Regulation, economists have recently discovered, is subject
to political manipulation by those who are supposed to be regulated. Jordan 21
distinguishes two variants of this theme: (1) regulation is introduced for
consumer protection but the regulatory process is corrupted and the regulators form an unholy alliance with the regulated; 22 and (2) regulation is
brought to an industry at its behest and is performed for its benefit.2 8 But
this literature misses a crucial point: while the institutions of regulation can
be manipulated in the producer's interest, so too can those of private contract.
Indeed, the firms might have been better off (and the consumers worse off)
under private contract. An unregulated airline industry, for example, might
attain a rule stating that the development of a new route is the production of
new knowledge and the developer should be granted an exclusive right to the
route for some period of time (analogous to patent or copyright protection).
The following mental exercise might prove instructive. Suppose that when
regulation first appeared before the Supreme Court (1871) it was found unconstitutional and was thereafter abandoned as an infeaible strategy. What
then would firms have done with the resources that would have otherwise
been used in attaining regulation or in influencing its course? How might the
rules of private property, contract, and procedure (for example, standing to
sue) have developed over the following century with producers' resources now
concentrated in this arena? It is not likely that consumers would have fared
very well in this case, especially in view of the Supreme Court's strongly probusiness orientation that persisted until the middle of the New Deal. 24 This is
not to say that regulation was the most desirable alternative in all cases.
The point is simply that the current critical literature makes a specious coin21

Wiflliam A. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of
Government Regulation, 15 J. Law & Econ. 151 (1972).
22
See, for example, Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955).
23 See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell
.. Econ. & Man. Sci. 3 (1971).
24
See Arthur S. Miller, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1968).
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parison between corrupt regulation and pristine private contract as if the
latter were the feasible alternative to the former. The same forces that bend
the one also bend the other.

We have thus far assumed that each group was acting as a single individual
in pursuit of the group's common goals; the group did not have to concern
itself with the difficulties of achieving this joint action. But this assumption
of a monolithic coalition masks some important problems. How does the group
manage to channel the resources of its members toward achievement of common goals? 25 What factors influence the group's ability to channel these resources? How do the institutional arrangements facilitate or impede this
joint behavior? In this section we will examine some of the implications of
dropping the monolithic coalition assumption. After some preliminary observations we will focus on the modem corporation as a coalition for influencing
institutional change.
25The discussion here substantially understates the complications that arise from
dropping the monolithic coalition assumption. We ignore all the strategic problems
involved in building and maintaining coalitions.
We also concern ourselves only with the group's pursuit of common goals. This ignores
an entirely different motive for forming (or joining) coalitions: to exploit the other
members. The individual will try to include as many other members as possible in the
coalition who can be induced to pay more in taxes, dues, or fees than they receive in
rewards--services, capital gains, or whatever. That is, the individual's goal will be to
use the coalition for satisfying his own preferences while imposing the costs, as far as
possible, on other members. Conversely, he will try to avoid coalitions in which he would
be a net loser.
In a world in which individuals had perfect information concerning the payoffs from
coalition membership and only voluntary coalitions were possible, this motive would not
be important. However, neither of these conditions hold. As a result, most coalitions contain a mix of rewards to joint action and rewards to action at the expense of the other
members. This characterization applies for voluntary as well as compulsory coalitions;
it can be applied to a cartel, for example, whether the cartel is legally protected or
whether it must rely on informal coordination.
One particularly interesting form of compulsory coalition is government. Individuals
are included in a wide range of overlapping jurisdictions ranging from the national government down to a vast array of special districts. In recent years the division of labor
between various levels of government has drawn increasing attention from economists
and a literature on "optimal decentralization" has emerged; for a summary, see Robert L.
Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas 35-62 (1971); and Wallace E. Oates,
Fiscal Federalism 31-63 (1972). Essentially this literature asks: how should jurisdictions
be established so that individuals can best satisfy their preferences by following their
own self-interest within these jurisdictional rules? But this ignores the fact that people
will be trying to change these jurisdictions in their own self-interest (gerrymandering is
an obvious example). We suspect that an integration of the self-interest motive in defining the rules (jurisdictions) with the optimal decentralization literature will lead to a
substantial revision of that literature; however, investigation of this conjecture will be
deferred to a future paper.
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All collective action is subject, to some degree, to the "free rider" problem.
If benefits are to be conferred on the entire group whether or not each member contributes, then each member has an incentive to be a free rider-to
reap the rewards while others pay the costs. If everyone tries to be a free
rider, however, there will be no benefits. In general, individuals in a coalition
will first have to guess how much other members of the group will pay to
achieve a given goal and then have to decide how much to allocate toward
achieving that goal.
The amount of resources that a group will have to influence rule changes
will depend, therefore, on its ability to induce (or force) potential free riders
to contribute to the group. 26 The group's success at influencing the results
will depend not only upon its ability to constrain its own free riders, but also
upon the ability of the opposing groups to constrain their free riders. This
ability to constrain free riders will depend upon the rules concerning coalitions. Any rules facilitating or inhibiting joint action will have concomitant
effects on the distribution of benefits-income, wealth, or the output mix.
Thus, the rules affecting coalition building, like other rules, both define the
existing environment for choice and provide an arena for conflict-there are
significant rewards to restructuring the rules regarding coalitions in one's
behalf.
For example, consider the situation in which a firm inflicts a small amount
of damage on a large number of people (for example, a single polluter in an
air basin or an automobile mechanic who makes unnecessary repairs); the
firm will have a strong incentive to have this problem handled on a case-bycase basis in the courts. In most instances, the costs to each victim of using
the courts will exceed the expected benefits of victory; consequently, under
such an arrangement the victims will seldom have an incentive to make their
case. The victims would therefore try to attain alternative institutional arrangements that would better enable them to combine their resources in the
collective pursuit of their individual interests. They might, for example, press
for a liberalization of the rules governing class action suits (either by legislative enactment or by judicial decree); alternatively they might attempt to
have some sort of collective enforcement through government intervention.
The two groups will, therefore, be willing to invest resources in changing
(or preventing the changing) of the rules regarding collective action. We can
also anticipate that an exogenous rule change enhancing the victim's ability
to engage in collective action will affect the relative benefits from various
strategies to both groups; the liberalization of rules governing class action
26

See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups (1965).
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suits would likely lead the firm to find the courts a relatively less attractive
jurisdiction while the victims would find the courts relatively more attractive.
The modem corporation can be viewed as a coalition of individuals seeking
the attainment of some specific goals--goals which can be attained either by
influencing institutional change or by working within the existing rules. This
view of the firm yields a very different picture of the merits of various policy
options than does the conventional view. The outlines of this picture wil be
sketched in the remainder of this section. The modern corporation is a coalition that has successfully managed to marshal the members' resources in their
joint interest. Rewards are structured to be roughly proportioned to the contributions of the members-stockholders receive a return related to the number of shares they hold and managers receive a return that is (less closely)
related to the skill and effort they provide. 27 The structuring of rewards is
not perfect and managers do have some opportunity to use the corporation's
resources in their own behalf; managers could, for example, sell trade secrets
to competitors or quit their jobs and either begin their own firms or join
with competitors, taking specialized knowledge or customer good will with
them. Restrictions on such managerial behavior will make the coalition more
successful. And many such restrictions do exist. An extensive body of law has
developed defining the fiduciary duties of managers; contracts restricting an
individual's ability to reenter a given industry for a given period are common;
laws prohibiting industrial espionage and insider trading are on the books
and are enforced, to a degree, by the government. In general, the rules governing the modem corporation are such as to make it a very effective political
28
instrument.
The firm's effectiveness as a political instrument is limited to certain problems. It can be very effective in lobbying for tariffs, special tax breaks and
other issues directly related to the firm's economic well-being. It will be much
less effective in lobbying for other issues, for example, social causes. The corporation's power, like the power of any coalition, cannot be wielded uniformly
across the board; it is very important in some policy areas and virtually
useless in others.
The firm's political effectiveness depends on the amount of resources it can
bring to influencing the rules: the larger the firm, the more power it has;2'
27

In a study of management compensation, Wilbur G. Lewellen & Blaine Huntsman,
Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 710 (1970), find that
managers' rewards are related to profitability.
2s We are concerned here with the single corporation as a political instrument, not
with the behavior of a large number of firms acting as a unified political force-for
example, the political power of big business.
29 Robert Goldfarb has suggested to me that increased size might in some instances
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the firm will utilize its power to structure the rules in its favor. The social
engineer has a number of possible responses to this. One is simply to ignore it.
Such a "laissez faire" policy will permit the corporations to make substantial
gains at the expense of their more poorly organized opposition (for example,
customers, labor, and future competitors).30 The firms will try to attain tariff
protection, entry restrictions, minimal liability for product failure and industrial accidents, rules that will further weaken their opposition in the future,
and so forth. Such a policy is, in short, not particularly attractive. But a brief
description of the alternatives will indicate that they do not unambiguously
dominate this policy. That is, the social engineer's choice is from among a
number of very imperfect alternatives. No effort will be made here to determine which alternatives might be best in a particular context; instead we shall
be content to indicate the complexity of the social engineer's problem.
The alternative approaches can be divided into two categories: conduct
and structure.Y1 The former consists of attempts to change the rules without
altering the corporation's relative political power; the latter aims directly at
influencing that power. In either case, the social engineer will find that the
firm will oppose such changes and that resources must be expended to overcome this opposition; such costs can help direct the social engineer in determining which alternative should be chosen.
lead to a decrease in power for the firm. The larger it is, the more visible it is and,
therefore, the greater is the likelihood that it will be scrutinized. That is, the firm will
find public opinion a more difficult obstacle to overcome simply because the firm is
recognized as being potentially more powerful.
On the other hand, the large firm will also be able to invest more resources for enhancing its image (see Section V, infra) and these expenditures would have an opposite
influence.
In any event, it seems reasonable to say that over some substantial range increases in
a firm's size will produce increases in its power and part of the social engineer's task
will be to structure the framework (rules and cultural milieu) so that the increased size
will not yield the increased power.

3o Customers will in many instances be large firms; in such cases the seller is unlikely
to have a significant advantage.
81 A third policy is exhortation or propagandizing-trying to induce people to act other
than in their immediate self-interest or simply fooling them into acting otherwise. Much
of the economist's role in institutional choices has been of this propagandizing nature:
tariffs (or minimum wages or farm programs) are not good for society, and therefore
beneficiaries should not use their resources to buy them. The economist's recommendation
is usually based on the implicit assumption that tastes (defined over goods) are not to
be tampered with. That is, if the utility function were U = U(X, I) where X is goods
and I is institutional changes, the economist chooses to maximize U* = U*(X) using the
preferences for institutional change as a policy variable. There is a nice irony in finding
that the economist's policy prescriptions based on given consumer tastes are grounded
in the implicit assumptions that (1) some tastes do not count at all, and (2) some tastes
are fair games for manipulation "in the social interest." For a further discussion of this
ambiguous treatment for the preference for institutional change, see Victor P. Goldberg,
Public Choice-Property Rights, 8 J. Econ. Issues 555, 559-61 (1974).
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The primary difficulty with the conduct approach is that is can degenerate
into a fire-fighting strategy. As one rule change is achieved (say, lowering a
tariff) the corporation's power is manifested in another direction. It is often
82
a case of dealing with symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem.
A classic example of the futility of limiting the firm's power by this approach
is the judicial treatment of insurance contracts in the first half of this century.
Kessler observes:
[C]ourts have made great efforts to protect the weaker contracting party and still
keep "the elementary rules" of the law of contracts intact .... The law of insurance
contracts furnishes excellent illustrations. Handicapped by the axiom that courts
can only interpret but cannot make contracts for the parties, courts had to rely
heavily on their prerogative of interpretation to protect a policy holder. To be sure
many courts have shown a remarkable skill in reaching "just" decisions by construing ambiguous clauses even in cases where there was no ambiguity.83
The response of the insurance companies was predictable. In Llewellyn's
words, "the greater bargainor, defeated once and again, recurs to the attack.
After each case he can redraft and fight again. A single victory, if achieved,
has good chance of being permanent. 384 Ultimately, the judicial approach was
abandoned with the legislature taking a more active role in defining the terms
of insurance contracts.
There are a number of different structural strategies for equalizing power.
One is to enhance the power of opposing coalitions-"a countervailing power"
approach; 3r the rules could, for example, be structured to encourage the
formation of strong labor unions. A second approach would be to keep firm
size small-by placing size limits on firms, by a restrictive merger policy, or
by lowering the size at which diseconomies of scale appear (for example,
making it legal for managers to sell trade secrets). A third approach (which
has thus far been assumed away) would be to enhance the value of resources
82 The choice of terminology deliberately borrows from the standard Industrial organization paradigm (see F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 3-6 (1970)). The general thrust of the industrial organization literature is that
basic structural characteristics influence conduct and, therefore, performance. Policy, consequently, requires structural modification--getting to the root of the problem rather
than treating symptoms. In the present context, however, economists' policy recommendations have been almost exclusively directed at the symptoms (conduct) rather than
the root (structure).
88 Friedrich Kessler, supra note 15, at 633.
84
Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J.
705, 732-34 (1931).
35
See John K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power
(1956).
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other than financial wealth for influencing the rules.8 6 For example, the value
of the number of bodies in the coalition (votes) would be enhanced relative
to financial wealth by rules placing limits on campaign spending.
To be sure, the structural approach entails costs to society which might be
substantial. Strong unions, besides their likely influence on production costs,
can in many instances find a common interest with the firm and join forces
in a more powerful coalition against some third party (union support of
tariffs and quotas is an example). A policy restricting firm size might entail
forgoing significant scale economies.
Note that the firm's power does not depend on its being large within a
particular market. It is possible for firms even in atomistic industries to pos-,
sess substantial power. Industry structure will, however, influence the areas
in which the firm will likely be successful in manipulating the rules. In an
atomistic industry the gains from changing a certain rule will often accrue
to all firms in the industry. The members of the industry will then be faced
with the free rider problem, and might well find that no one is willing to make
the expenditure; but there are many cases in which the gains can accrue
solely to one firm. For example, a firm competing in an atomistic national
market might be able to convince the local government to provide it with
publicly financed police services or garbage collection. The more atomistic
the industry, the more the firms' efforts will be concentrated in such areas
37
in which the free rider problem is not important.
The point is this: firms are political instruments-it is in their self-interest
to be so-and they are very good political instruments. In the absence of
strategies to constrain conduct or alter structure, firms will be able to tilt the
rules substantially to their advantage and produce a world that is a far cry
from the apolitical ideal of economists. It is naive to expect otherwise. Why
would an organization that is actively seeking profits Uithin the rules of the
game not seek further profits by altering the rules of the game as wellespecially when its structure makes it likely that it will succeed? The restraining strategies (like minimum wages, prohibitions on conglomerate
mergers, 8 or limitations on patent exploitation) must be evaluated not against
the standard of the apolitical competitive market but against what the unconstrained firm would otherwise have attained. This is no mean task. It is
36These other resources are introduced into the analysis in the next section.
37The members of the atomistic industry might also fight for rules which permit the
members to enhance their ability to work together toward common goals--for example,
the legalization of trade association activities.
88 For an analysis of conglomerate merger policy using the approach developed here,
see George Berger & Victor P. Goldberg, Conglomerate Merger Policy: A New Approach,
(Inst. Govt. Affairs, Univ. of Calif., Davis, Res. Rep. No. 28, 1973).
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much easier to analyze a policy on the
be affected by the policy and that all
But if this assumption is wrong, as
prudence requires that the additional
grated into the evaluation process.

assumption that all other rules will not
these rules are, in some sense, "okay."
the preceding analysis suggests, then
complications be in some manner inte-

IV
Groups will have many other resources beside financial wealth at their
disposal both to influence institutional change and to enhance the outcomes
from the various institutional arrangements. A group's ability to use physical
force is one obvious resource. The ability to withhold services-for example,
strikes or threats of plant closings-is another.3 9 The ability to vote is a third.
Extension of the list is bounded only by the imagination of the reader.4 0 A
given institutional framework will reward some resources more than others.
These resources are differentially distributed-some groups will have a substantial bankroll but few voters while others will have a very different endowment. Outcomes will depend on the institutional structure. So, self-interest
would dictate that the participants direct their efforts at influencing this set
of rules also. Groups will attempt to have their affairs governed by rules that
reward the resources with which they are relatively well endowed.
Changing the rules to make financial power relatively less important than
another resource, say votes, will not necessarily result in dramatic changes
in outcomes. For one thing, the wealthy groups will adjust to the rule change
and try to attain the best deal possible under the new rules given their stock
of resources; such an adjustment might take the form of using the financial
wealth to influence voters thus offsetting to some degree the group's relative
disadvantage. Second, the endowments of the various resources will often be
closely correlated. A group that can muster substantial financial support for
an issue (relative to its opponents) can often muster substantial electoral
support (again relative to its opponents). For example, producers who stand
to gain substantially from a tariff will frequently find it worthwhile to vote
89

This includes a wide range of action. A baseball club owner can threaten to move
the franchise if the local government will not pay the costs of improving the stadium;
a firm can threaten to move if property taxes are not kept low; or a more subtle threat
can be made-the firm will move into a jurisdiction only if certain tax concessions are
made.
40
Warren F. Ilchman & Norman Thomas Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change
(1969), list six resources that influence an individual's well-being; economic goods and
services, status, information, force, legitimacy, and authority. Michael Lipsky, Protest
as a Political Resource, 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1144 (1968), discusses "protest" as a political resource of the poor. It should be clear that these nonfinancial resources are a
very loosely defined lot. Fortunately, the discussion here does not require much rigor.
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for candidates solely on this issue; consumers will find the gains from opposing any given tariff too small to be a major determinant of their vote and the
producers will, therefore, remain the relatively stronger party.41 This does
not mean that the outcomes will be insensitive to the rules governing the
relative value of resources; it simply means that we should neither be so
naive as to expect miracles from such rule changes nor should we hold the
results of such rule changes up against some mythical unattainable standard:
what would have happened if producers (or economic actors in general) were
not acting in their own interest.
A number of studies show that political participation is positively associated
with socio-economic status. Summarizing this literature, May notes:
In general, people who are effective in private life are effective in public life,
people with more education know more about politics, people who care about what
happens in politics participate more, people who engage in some political activities
are highly likely to participate in others, and people of higher socio-economic status
are more likely to possess the characteristics which lead to high rates of participation.42
Whether dollars or votes are to be rewarded, the poor will lose. Publicly provided education, library services, garbage collection, police protection, and
48
other services will generally be better for the wealthy than for the poor.
But a social engineer interested in redressing the balance in favor of the poor
might still find public provision the superior policy. The voting power of the
poor might be relatively stronger than its financial power. More important,
however, is the group's potential power. Suppose some political entrepreneur
were to come along to mobilize this latent coalition. If the rules primarily
rewarded dollars, the coalition's power would be scarcely enhanced; however,
if votes were rewarded the story would be quite different-the rewards to
organization can be a substantial increase in the relative power of the poor.44
41

This is, of course, not necessarily true if the customer is another business firm.
Judith V. May, Citizen Participation: A Review of the Literature 2 (1971); May
provides a detailed summary of the literature at 40-59.
43 For a case study of the distribution of public services, see Frank S. Levy, Arnold
Meltsner, & Aaron Wildavsky, Urban Outcomes: Schools, Streets and Libraries (1974).
44
One reason suggested by May for the low participation of the poor is that this is a
rational adjustment to their expectations of results. The system is structured so that they
do not receive rewards and therefore participation would not yield rewards; hence, nonparticipation is a sensible strategy. If, however, an entrepreneur (like a Saul Alinsky)
can mobilize the group and deliver some results, the group's participation would increase.
If this rational adjustment model does explain a good bit of the poor's lower participation
rates-it is by no means clear that it does-then this further enhances the rewards to
the poor of having institutions which reward voting power relative to financial power.
42
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V
Institutional choice takes place under great ignorance. The results stemming from the establishment of new institutions or modifications in existing
ones are seldom known precisely and are often widely divergent from the
original expectations. Individuals often do not know the rules for attaining
results through the existing institutions or for modifying the rules in their
favor; they are also subject to varying degrees of ignorance concerning the
existence of potential members of their coalition. Resources can be allocated
toward partially dispelling this ignorance. Institutional choice can be made,
therefore, with the intention of manipulating the flow of information.
There are economies of scale in providing information and the institutional
framework will determine in part who the beneficiaries of these economies are.
For example, reliance on private contract enhances the value of legal expertise,
thereby favoring the specialists providing such expertise-lawyers-and those
with the resources to buy the specialist's services. As before, groups will try
to attain institutions which reward the resources with which they are relatively
well endowed.
Equally important, the flow of information can be manipulated to influence
outcomes. Politicians will make promises or spread rumors about their opponents to influence election results; lawyers will use impassioned oratory to
sway jurors; community organizers will convince slum dwellers that they have
problems (and resources for ameliorating those problems).4 The rewards to
the provision, distortion, and concealment of information can be substantial.
The obvious implication of this is that a group should allocate resources
toward the manipulation of information to induce favorable results. Rather
than using up scarce political resources fighting for a tax loophole, for example, the group might find that the same result can be achieved by convincing
enough political opponents that the issue is not "tax loopholes" but "preventing unemployment." Such rephrasing can yield substantial "cost reductions"
to the group.
45
In describing Saul Alinsky's method of community organization, Silberman writes:
'Quite frequently . . . the apathy that characterizes the slum represents what in many
ways is a realistic response to a hostile environment. But realistic or not, the adjustment
that is reached is one of surrender to the existing conditions and abdication of any hope
of change. The result isa community seething with inarticulate resentments and dormant
hostilities repressed for safety's sake, but which break out every now and then in some
explosion of deviant or irrational behavior. The slum dwellers are incapable of acting, or
even of joining, until these repressed resentments and hostilities are brought to the surface
where they can be seen as problems-i.e., as a condition you can do something about...
And so Alinsky pleads guilty to the charge of being an agitator, of arousing dormant
hostilities or rubbing raw the sores of discontent ... " See Charles E. Silberman, Crisis
in Black and White 334-35 (1964).
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Implicit in this example is the notion that preventing unemployment will
be received more favorably than creating a new tax loophole. This, however,
depends on society's value structure-on the legitimacy of these two goals-which suggests a third point: resources can (and will) be allocated toward
altering societal values. That is, the cultural milieu is not completely exogenous. In essence, the self-interest model can be further extended to include
changes in social values.46 Harsanyi, for example, argues:
[Social values] change because there is a shift, real or apparent, in the balance of
the advantages and disadvantages associated with alternative forms of behavior.
Social values change because people find that they will be better off by not conforming to the old social values than they would be by conforming to them.
[A]n important disincentive is expected opposition and possibly even actual sanc47
tions, from some other members of the society.
Extension of the analysis to include the manipulation of information and
values would take us too far afield, but it is at least worth noting that such
manipulation will be an important aspect of the political process and will
make the social engineer's problem that much more complex.
VI
To demonstrate how the social engineer might take into account the implications of the expanded self-interest model, it is useful to return to the problem of the standard form contract. The truncated self-interest model treats
the problem by assuming it away. If people voluntarily enter into contracts
it is because it is in their best interest to do so. If the terms of one producer
are unsatisfactory, the customer will shop around for others; if information
on contract terms were costlessly available (and could be analyzed costlessly)
he would continue shopping until he received precisely the desired combina46 The legal rules can be viewed as a subset of all society's devices for influencing
behavior: duty, extra-legal force, trust, ethical codes, etc. Behavior can be effectively
constrained if an action is considered unethical, even if it is not illegal. (Conversely,
activities that are illegal will be difficult to constrain if they are not considered unethical.)
Most behavior is constrained well within the bounds of the law by such non-legal devices.
See John R. Commons, supra note 15; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic
Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in
U.S. Cong., Joint Economic Comm., Subcomm. on Economy in Government, The Analysis
and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB system 62 (1969); and Stewart
Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Socio.
Rev. 55 (1963).
47 John C. Harsanyi, Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist
and Conformist Theories, 21 World Politics 513, 527-29 (1969).
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tion of price, quantity, and other contract terms. This, implicitly, is how
economists have handled the problem. Additional sophistication occasionally
creeps in by the recognition of costs of attaining, processing, and evaluating
information; the consumer then would engage in such information processing
to the point at which the expected marginal benefits of the additional infor48
mation are equated to the marginal costs of its acquisition.
Suppose, however, that rather than view the standard form contract as a
voluntary agreement, we view it instead as private legislation; the legislature
in effect delegates the lawmaking process to private parties. 49 The previous
analysis suggests the bias that this "legislation" might have. We will first
stipulate that we are interested here only in the "hidden" terms of the contract-those beside the basic price and quantity terms. 50 While such terms
could be tailor-made for each contract, there are substantial economies to be
gained by spreading the costs of producing (and analyzing the impact of)
these terms over a large number of contracts. 51 The firm, which regularly
enters into the same type of transactions, will be able to achieve these economies (either by itself or by purchasing the service from specialists-lawyers) ;
the consumer, generally, will not. The standard form contract therefore will
be legislation produced in an arena which rewards the resources held by one
party-the firm. The result, in Llewellyn's words "has seemed even in such
highly competitive spheres as installment sales, residence leases, investments,
and commercial banking to be . . . [the] accumulation of seller-protective
52
instead of customer-protective clauses."
48 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).

49 Some readers of earlier drafts of this paper did not like this characterization. We
might alternatively argue that firms invest resources in the political market for the
purpose of keeping certain activities (that is, those covered by standard form contracts)
in the private market arena. Such an approach would entail some differences in the
analysis, but the conclusions should remain unaffected.
50 The terms are sometimes literally hidden: warranty agreements for packaged consumer
products are often placed inside the box; insurance policies are usually not sent to the
buyer until after the insurance is purchased; yet the warranties and policies are considered to be contracts. These examples are discussed in W. David Slawson, supra note 6,
at 540-1.
51 For a brief description of the economies of scale in contract term standardization,
see Friedrich Kessler, supra note 15, at 631-32, and W. David Slawson, supra note 6, at
530-31.
52
Karl N. Llewellyn, supra note 34, at 734. Standardized terms are usually used to
cover the distribution of risks between buyers and sellers, for example, the possibility
that the borrower might default on an installment contract. Slawson describes typical
terms in such contracts: "Standard credit agreements commonly allow the lender to call
the entire unpaid balance, plus costs of collection, should even a single payment be a
moment late, or, not uncommonly, should the lender just wake up some morning feeling
'insecure." (W. David Slawson, supra note 6, at 531-32.) Clearly, someone has to make
decisions as to how these risks (or others) ought to be distributed. The argument here
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We might expect competition in the market to constrain the firm's power
in this arena. After all, the firm makes its price in this arena too, and if the
industry is reasonably competitive we would expect that this competition
would shield the price taker from the firm's power. Why will not competition
among producers protect the contract term taker as well? 58 The answer is
twofold. On the one hand the cost of acquiring and processing information
on contract terms is much greater than for price; unless the firm intentionally
makes the particular term an important selling point-as is sometimes the
case with the length or inclusiveness of the warranty-few, if any, customers
will perceive the existence of variations in terms. Any movement toward contractual equilibrium due to the aggressive bargain-seeking of a few customers
will be slow indeed due to both (1) the fewness of customers who will find it
worthwhile to pay the costs of acquiring information, and (2) the ease with
which a producer can "contract term discriminate"-renegotiate the terms for
the few aggressive customers while keeping the high information barrier for
other customers virtually intact. 54 The second answer is that the "aggressive
bargain-seeking customer" is usually just a minor figure in the equilibrating
process. More important, in general, is the role of new entry (or exit) of
producers. If the firms in an industry are making profits because they have
written standardized contract terms that are very favorable to them, they will
attract new entrants into the industry. The entry will continue until excess
profits are bid away. The benefits to the firms of the standardized terms will
be capitalized into the firms' value. Thus, while competition between producers
is simply that standardized private contracts do not in general permit the customer to
influence this distribution.
53 The analysis assumes that the terms are completely hidden from the consumers;
but this is an extreme case. Some terms are less hidden than others. Some terms can
be changed and will react to market conditions; for example, in a very loose housing
market we would expect that a number of restrictions on tenants would either be
eliminated or honored in the breach. We would also anticipate that firms would be
reluctant to enforce terms which would jeopardize customer good will-to some degree,
at least, the customers will be able to discipline the firms by shifting their purchases to
other firms. But we still maintain that most of the terms that would be covered in a
standardized contract would be too difficult for the customer to comprehend and, therefore, would be rather insensitive to market discipline.
The oppressiveness of the standardized terms is somewhat attenuated by the fact that
the firms often do not enforce them. The consumer can discipline the producer who
attempts to enforce the oppressive terms by shifting his future patronage to other
producers or by giving the firm negative publicity. The firm has to judge whether the
benefits of enforcement in a given instance will outweigh these costs. These defenses,
of course are still available to the consumer if contract terms are produced by- the
government rather than the firm.
54 In a study of residential leases in Ann Arbor, Warren Mueller found that some
tenants were able to modify the fine-print terms of their standard form leases, although
most tenants did not try; see Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases:
An Empirical Study, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 247 (1970).
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will in the long run yield zero profits, the firm will be able to attain a capital
gain (or prevent a capital loss) by choosing the appropriate standard contract
terms.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the industry as a whole will
be better off or that the industry's gains will come at the expense of the consumer. It might well be that the equilibrium terms arrived at are optimal for
both producers and consumers, but there is no reason to presume this to be
true. Consider, for example, the following scenario. Assume a competitive insurance industry with minimal government intervention. Firms in the industry
compete by lowering their price and then compensate for this by decreasing
the coverage (in as hidden a way as possible) with other firms being forced to
cut also in order to remain competitive. A sort of "Gresham's Law" of bad
policies driving out good would ensue. Both the quality of insurance contracts
and the total sales of the industry are likely to fall. 55
This is not the end of the story. Both producers and consumers will have
incentives to search for methods for improving upon this result. Ignoring
solutions relying on an active government (to which we turn below) a number
of solutions might arise. Brand names and advertising might be used as indicators of product quality in general (including the terms of the contract) ;56
consumers might take price as an indicator of quality; or private producers
of information might appear. While such private market solutions will, to some
extent, ameliorate the Gresham's Law problem considered in the previous
paragraph, there is no reason to believe that the market will negate the
57
standard form contract problem.
If the government's role is restricted to passive enforcement of private contracts, then there will be many standard form contract terms produced which
are, in effect, legislation produced by a single party. The consumer need not
necessarily suffer as a result, but his protection by market forces will in many
instances be weak. Indeed, if we could argue that standard forms inevitably
led to the enrichment of producers at the expense of consumers, the task of
our social engineer would be considerably simplified. But this is not the case.
55 See, for example, George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970).
56
Without reading the fine print of a sales contract, the consumer can be assured that
an item purchased at store X will be returnable if there is a defect. In many instances
the retailer's good name will be an adequate substitute for reading the contract.
57For an optimistic evaluation of the market's ability to deal with problems of
product quality, see Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal
Amount of Fraud, 16 J. Law & Econ. 67 (1973); for a more pessimistic discussion see
Victor P. Goldberg, Consumer Choice, Imperfect Information, and Public Policy (Inst.
Govt. Affairs, Univ. of Calif., Davis, Res. Rep. No. 26, 1973). Posner argues that
standard form contracts will not present a problem, so long as there is competition; see
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1969).
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In some instances all parties will benefit from the standard forms while in
others all parties will be hurt. In many instances some consumers will benefit
while others will be harmed. (For example, harsh terms will, in equilibrium,
yield lower prices; those who would prefer the harsh term-low price combination will benefit at the expense of those who would have preferred an easier
term-higher price combination.58 ) Thus, the social engineer faces problems
in identifying situations in which parties are likely to be helped by intervention and a further set of problems in balancing the anticipated benefits to
some groups against the losses of others.
How should the courts react to the standard form contract? If they were
to adopt the economist's faulty idealization of the contracting process, courts
would accept the terms of the contract without question and hold the parties
to them. Courts have essentially stuck to this approach"9 although (as noted
in the discussion of insurance contracts in Section IV) they have often resorted to very liberal interpretations of the contract to reach what they regard
as a fair result. 6° A number of commentators"l have argued that only by
divorcing themselves from the fiction that the standard form contract is no
different from the idealized contract between equals will courts be able to
come to grips with the problem. Slawson, for example, argues that the court
must decide what the consumer could reasonably have been expected to consider as part of the transaction. This alone the court should accept as the
contract to which the consumer has manifested agreement.6 2 The other terms
must then be judged against some reasonable standards; essentially, all goods
sold with a standard form have an "implied warranty of fitness for intended
purpose." 63 Even if an express warranty is included in the standard form it
58People might think they preferred the low price arrangement because they did not
fully understand the contract terms. It does not make sense to treat such individuals
as being worse off if they are prohibited from entering into such contracts. For further
discussion of this, see Victor P. Goldberg, supra note 57.
59"[Clourts generally purport to enforce all terms in standard forms because they
regard standard forms as contracts." W. David Slawson, supra note 6, at 562.
60 "This is not to say that courts presently enforce all standard forms, no matter how
oppressive. The Uniform Commercial Code expressly empowers a court to ignore terms
in a contract which are 'unconscionable.' Even without statutory authority, courts commonly 'construe' or disregard written contractual terms in order to reach a result which
they believe equitable." W. David Slawson, supra note 6, at 561.
61See W. David Slawson, supra note 6; Friedrich Kessler, supra note 15; Warren
Mueller, supra note 54 and W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (1964).
62 The consumer's manifested agreement is not sufficient according to Slawson if the
contract is a "contract of adhesion." Basically, these are contracts in which the consumer
has little real choice because the producer enjoys a monopoly position. For a more
complete discussion of the concept and of Slawson's method of dealing with it, see
W. David Slawson, supra note 6, at 549-61.
e3 W. David Slawson, supra note 6, at 546.
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will not be treated as part of the contract if the court finds it inconsistent
with the implied warranty.
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Slawson's proposal. Clearly,
courts will differ substantially in determining what part of a standard form
contract has-been agreed to and what part must pass the reasonableness test;
they will further disagree as to what ought to determine reasonableness. The
point, though, is that it is possible for judges to abandon the mythology of
freedom of contract and to put limits on the ability of the firm(s) to produce
private legislation in the form of standard contracts.
While the courts might in the future be induced to take a more pro-consumer
stance in litigation, this will likely prove of only marginal assistance to most
consumers. 64 Lawsuits are expensive, risky affairs with the expenses frequently
in excess of the expected gains to the single individual were he to win. Realizing this, firms would have little incentive to remove unenforceable terms from
their contracts. (Many contracts carry unenforceable waivers of liability; a
consumer when shown he had "agreed" to this provision would likely give up
rather than bring the matter to a lawyer. 65 ) So, while some relief for the
consumer might be possible in the judicial arena, it is doubtful that this in
itself would be of much value.
One possible response to the standard form contract problem would be to
provide consumers with an agent who would aid in the production of standardized terms. 66 The government can fill the role of agent; assume initially
an ideal government attempting to fill this role faithfully. The legislature
could suggest terms that the parties might include in their contracts if they
so agree, set terms that will hold unless the contract explicitly replaces them, 67
64One intermediate step between individual legal actions and governmental intervention is the class action suit. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in extending
class action suits to consumer protection, see American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Consumer Class Action Legislation (Legislative Analysis No. 23, 1972).
Lest the reader misinterpret Slawson, he is not arguing that only the courts should
have jurisdiction. Indeed, Slawson argues that statutory enactments should be regarded
by the courts as authoritative standards in determining whether the implied warranty
terms are reasonable.
65 Warren Mueller, supra note 54, at 280. Mueller provides examples of such clauses
in apartment leases; he found that about half the tenants surveyed considered specific
unenforceable clauses to be enforceable, id. at 272.
66 In the employment context the union fills this role: it should be clear that much
of the argument here is applicable to the employment relationship. Reversing the analogy,
it would be possible to have consumer organizations, perhaps with compulsory membership, that would be recognized bargaining agents for a group of consumers (for example,
tenant unions). Such non-governmental agents will not, however, be considered here.
67This option might be of little value to consumers since producers can simply ignore
the legislature's advice and continue to produce terms which the consumer accepts in
ignorance. There are a couple of reasons, however, for thinking that even these optional
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prohibit the inclusion of certain terms, or set terms which cannot be altered
by the parties. Alternatively the legislature might choose to delegate the task
to a regulatory agency (or other nonlegislative body). This arrangement permits an ongoing review of contract terms; the agency can adjust terms in
light of past experience and can bargain with the producers concerning
possible innovations.
Not all consumers will benefit equally from the agent's efforts. Indeed, in
most instances some consumers are likely to be worse off, receiving protection
from a clause that affected them little or not at all in exchange for a higher
price. Given that the agent's costs must be spread over a large number of
consumers with different preferences, it is inevitable that the agent must
regularly engage in making interpersonal comparisons in producing contract
terms. To be sure, the same is true without government intervention where
the firm (or the market) in effect plays the role of agent in producing and
modifying standard form contract terms.
It should come as no surprise that the agent will be at least in part a
"double agent." Producers will seek a voice in determining who plays the
role of agent and will ultimately try to influence the nature of the terms
produced, the penalties for noncompliance, and the extent of public enforcement. The results will be substantially less favorable to consumers than those
of an "ideal government." But how might they compare to the "no government" case in which the legislature delegates the task of determining the
standardized terms directly to the firm?
If we confine our analysis to the relative political power of the parties,
then it is by no means clear that the consumer has less power in the governmental solution; indeed, it is quite likely that the opposite is the case. Relative
power in itself says little about the nature of the outcomes. The consumer
might still be better off with a private market solution in which he has no
effective political power. But it is at least important to note that there is no
reason to presume that moving from a laissez faire rule to a governmental
arrangement leads to an increase in political power for the producer.68
terms might be of some value to the consumer. First, the production of contract terms is
not costless and firms might well find it less expensive to adopt a "free" terms from the
government rather than producing their own (or purchasing it from lawyers). Second,
firms cannot be sure that all terms in their contracts will prove valid in court; they
can lessen the threat of a lawsuit (and the risks of losing it or simply of fighting it,
which might entail the loss of customer good will) by adopting a terms produced by the
government. The desirability of adopting government-suggested terms would be enhanced
if the courts were to adopt Slawson's approach-the use of government-suggested terms
would be prima fade evidence of reasonableness.
6SNore that in the laissez faire situation, the relatively powerful party is the individual producer, while in the case of governmental intervention the consumer is faced
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To further complicate the social engineering problem, we must note two
additional features of governmental intervention. On the one hand, the legitimate need for a government agent in determining contract terms can be used
69
as a rationale for promoting arrangements which will benefit the producer for example, price determination or entry restriction. On the other hand, promoting consumer interests will often go hand in hand with promoting producer
interests as the earlier Gresham's Law example indicated; governmental intervention might prove a simple, effective way of short-circuiting that problem.
The point of this discussion is twofold: first, a case can be made for governmental intervention on the consumer's behalf in dealing with standard
form contracts; second, the issue of relative political power which would normally be used against intervention cuts both ways-the relative power of the
consumer might well be greater in the case of government intervention. We
are not arguing that governmental intervention should be the rule. Such a
determination would require further analysis. With this discussion we hope
that we have shown that the approach developed in this paper will be useful
in guiding that further analysis.70
The standard form contract problem is representative of a wide range of
problems with similar characteristics: decisions are made in an arena which
rewards almost exclusively the resources held 'by one party (the firm); the
costs of dispelling the other party's ignorance by individual action are very
high, if not prohibitive; and it is likely that the other party can spread the
costs of acquiring information and negotiating contracts through collective
action. One example is the determination of liability for accidents. (Indeed,
this is one of the problems that producers will often include in standard form
contracts. 71) McKean, 7 2 to some degree, and Buchanan,78 to a much greater
with a group of producers. One important determinant of outcomes ignored in this discussion is the ability of producers to coordinate their behavior in both cases.
09 See Victor P. Goldberg, supra note 57. If these other goals would have been attained
regardless of this rationale, then this is not a cost properly attributed to governmental
intervention in standard form contracts.
70For further discussion of these issues, see Victor P. Goldberg, supra note 57.
71 For example, the following term was included in the leases in at least three apartment complexes in Ann Arbor (cited in Warren Mueller, supra note 54, at 280): "The
automobile parking space, laundry drying space, children's play areas, or other facilities
.. . shall be deemed gratuitously furnished by the Landlord and.., if any person shall
use the same, such person does so at his or her own risk and upon the express understanding and stipulation that the Landlord shall not be liable for any loss of property
through theft, casualty, or otherwise, or for any damage or injury whatever to person
or property."
72
Roland N. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 3 (1970).
3
7 James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 64 (1970);
see also Walter Y. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 Bell J. Econ. & Man. Sci. 3
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degree, argue that, in general, the courts should place liability on the customer
unless he explicitly contracts out of liability. The customer, they argue, should
not be deprived of the choice of attaining a product at a lower price with a
concomitantly greater risk of accident. The argument here suggests that in
most instances this is no real choice at all. How, for example, is the consumer
to ascertain whether a firm's soda bottles will explode one time in ten million,
twenty million or a hundred million?7 4 Producers will, in effect, be able to
write legislation determining who is to bear the risks of accidents. The customer will in many cases be better off either by having the courts move the
liability towards producers 75-as they have, in fact, been doing-or by legislating alternative rules or product standards. We are under no illusions that
legislators will act solely in the consumer's interest or that bureaucrats will
76
enforce standards with the consumer's interests foremost in their minds.
The point is that as badly as the consumer is likely to fare in the legislative
arena, he is likely to be relatively better off than if he were "free" to negotiate
voluntary agreements to determine liability.
VII
More than a decade ago, Stigler argued that "the professional study of economics makes one politically conservative,17 7 conservatism being a predisposition toward the private market and a general skepticism toward government
intervention and privately imposed constraints on the individual (compulsory
unions, for example). Such conservatism, Stigler noted (approvingly), influences both the types of problems to which economists devote their professional
(1973) ; for a contrary argument, see Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of Product
Safety and Imperfect Information, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Man. Sci. 683 (1974).
74 One of the important decisions leading toward the establishment of strict liability
did involve the explosion of a soda bottle; seee Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
75 The question of the proper placement of liability is a very complicated one. There
are many instances in which consumers as a group are likely to benefit by not placing
the liability on the producer. For an interesting discussion of the complexities involved,
see Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970).
76Not only can the bureaucrats be unresponsive to consumer interests in determining
and enforcing standards, but standards they set can be used to facilitate oligopolistic
coordination. For a detailed discussion of the anti-competitive use of product standards
(either set by governments or by trade associations), see John Ferguson et al., Consumer
Ignorance as a Source of Monopoly Power: FTC Staff Report on Self-Regulation, Standardization and Product Differentiation, 5 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. No. 2, at 79,
No. 3, at 55 (Winter & Spr. 1972).
77 George J. Stigler, The Politics of Political Economists, 73 Q.J. Econ. 522 (1959).
Stigler was, to be sure, quite cavalier in generalizing about all economists. But we think
most economists would concur that he painted a reasonably accurate picture of mainstream economics.
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attention and the policy prescriptions of economists. It provides the ideological
lenses through which the economist perceives his world. An underlying theme
of this paper is that this conservative bias does indeed exist and that it is
nurtured by the economist's failure to link the prime mover of his systemself-interest-with the institutional structure in which the economy operates.
The implication of this linkage, as traced out in the previous five sections, is
that the economist's Weltanschauung leads him to ignore or answer incor-

rectly a number of important questions that should rightly come in his domain
-the

allocation of resources.

